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I.  Introduction   
 
In the 1960s, Africa’s economic growth was similar to South Asia (Collier and Gunning 
1999a).  However, between 1970 and 2000, the average GDP per capita growth rate was only 0.5 
percent per annum, and sub-Saharan Africa is now the poorest continent.2  In the decade before 
the recent financial crisis, however, the continent experienced a resurgence in growth.  Growth in 
GDP for the continent averaged 5.9 percent annually (World Economic Forum 2009).  Is this 
trend sustainable?  How can Africa keep growing? What are the key policies that facilitate 
Africa’s economic performance? 
This paper sheds light on these questions using micro data.  We use recent surveys of the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for more than 80 countries.  We combine these surveys with 
other cross-country datasets on politics, macro policies, geography and the business environment, 
to study the determinants of performance of formal manufacturing firms.  Our goal is to explore 
the key factors behind Africa’s disadvantage, if any, relative to other regions.3  We focus in 
particular on African firm performance relative to firms in countries from other continents with 
GDP per capita below 3000 U.S. dollars. We look at a comprehensive set of firm performance 
outcomes, including static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, export shares, and investment rates.    
Our paper adds to the literature explaining Africa’s economic performance (see Collier 
and Gunning 1999a, 1999b; Bigsten and Soderbom 2006).  There are many previous studies 
examining one aspect of firm performance (such as investment rates, sales growth, exports, or 
productivity), often using one or several African countries’ firm-level data.  However, there is no 
                                                            
2 The numbers are based on World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
3 In the rest of this paper, we use SSA and Africa interchangeably.  Africa does not include the North Africa region 
in this paper. It is important to keep in mind that all firms in the World Bank Enterprise Survey that we use consist 
of formal firms. In a few African countries, informal firms were also surveyed, but the number of countries is too 
small to merit a full scale cross-country firm-level study. 
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study, as far as we know, that examines all these key determinants of African development at the 
firm level, with both large African and non-African firm samples.  We aim to be comprehensive 
in including potential explanatory variables: firm characteristics, geography, infrastructure, 
access to finance, political and institutional factors, and (other) aspects of the business 
environment (including labor flexibility, corruption, international competition, domestic 
competition, and crime). 4  In light of the limited financial and administrative capacity of 
reformers and policy makers—capacity that is especially constrained in Africa—it is important 
to identify the key constraints to growth (Hausman et al. 2005).   
Our broad focus on firm performance thus differentiates our paper from the existing 
studies of African firms, which tend to focus on a single outcome at a time and miss important 
aspects of how African firms behave and perform. Without controls, we find that formal African 
manufacturing firms have significant disadvantages across all performance measures, including 
productivity, labor productivity growth, sales growth, investment rates and export intensity.   Yet 
if we control for infrastructure, access to finance, the political and business environment, African 
firms lead in productivity levels and growth rates.  We interpret the positive premium for African 
firms, after controlling for the political and business environment, as suggesting that there is no 
inherent African disadvantage.  Taken at face value, if one could adjust observable policy or 
environmental factors, African firms possess an intrinsic advantage. For export intensity and 
investment rates, the Africa dummy is insignificant. Whatever makes African firms lag behind 
can thus be explained by observable differences in a few key elements of the environment. 
We then break down the differences between African and other manufacturing firms to 
identify which factors explain constraints on performance. Infrastructure and access to finance 
                                                            
4 See Xu 2011 for a survey of this growing literature. 
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prove to be of paramount importance in explaining Africa’s disadvantage relative to similar 
income countries. Party monopoly also plays an important role.   The longer a single political 
party remains in power, the lower are firm productivity and sales growth rates.  In contrast, many 
elements thought to be important for explaining African performance are found to matter less: 
geography, crime, domestic and international competition do not matter as much.  
This paper also adds to the literature on the effects of the (broadly-defined) business 
environment.  We obtain several novel findings. First, modern telecommunications development 
is of critical importance. Second, even relative to formal finance, trade credit plays an especially 
important role in developing countries.  Third, political monopoly is negatively associated with 
productivity growth rates and firm expansion.    Finally, different policies have distinct 
implications for structural change.  Telecom development, for instance, is structure-neutral: it 
helps manufacturing and services about equally and facilitates both low- and high-tech 
manufacturing.  In contrast, development of banking helps services more than manufacturing, 
and corruptions hurts services more than manufacturing.  Some tariff protection helps high tech 
manufacturing but not low-tech manufacturing.   Party monopoly hurts manufacturing much 
more than services.   
In each of the survey countries of the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) included in 
this paper, firms of all sizes and ownership are covered for both manufacturing and services.  
The survey questions are broad, including detailed quantitative measures which allow us to infer 
firm performance such as labor productivity levels and growth rates, TFP, sales growth, 
investment rates and export intensity.  Moreover, the survey asks detailed questions, both 
subjective and objective, on the political, institutional, and business environment that a firm 
faces, such as infrastructure issues, regulatory burdens, corruption, crime, and access to finance.  
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To produce comprehensive measures of the business environment, we supplement the WBES 
data with cross-country data on the political and business environment: telecommunications, 
infrastructure quality, the incidence of domestic conflicts, and political competition. 
We address the potential endogeneity of the business environment in several ways.5 First, 
we mainly rely on objective measures of the business environment. Subjective answers may be 
based on firms’ performance directly, and may be determined by country-specific factors such as 
exposure to the media and development history.  Second, we do not directly use firms’ answers 
on the business environment.  Instead, we rely on city-industry-size averages of firm answers to 
gauge the local business environment.  This local measure is less subject to the reverse causality 
issue associated with firm-level answers, and may provide a better proxy for the actual business 
environment. Finally, to check for possible omitted variables, we control for additional local and 
country-level determinants of firm outcomes, and show that our key results remain robust.  
However, with observational data, it remains true that endogeneity issues—especially in the 
context of a horse race between various alternative explanations—can never be ignored.  This is 
especially true when many conventional instruments proposed for a particular variable (such as 
institutions) are often correlated with other channels in the residual of the performance equation 
(Bazzi and Clemens 2010; Morck and Yeung 2011).  We thus resort to as many robustness 
checks as possible, and offer a coherent story to tie various findings together (Rosenbaum 2010). 
We offer a menu of facts and explanations, and we invite readers to offer alternative explanations 
for what we find here. 
 
 
                                                            
5 See also Dollar et al. 2006, Aterido et al. forthcoming; Xu 2011 
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II. Data and Measurement   
The main data sources for this paper are the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (WBES) in 
around 80 countries.  The WBES data are collected by the World Bank to benchmark the 
investment climate in developing countries across the world and to understand the determinants 
of firm performance and behavior.  In each country the survey was based on the universe of 
eligible firms obtained from the country’s statistical office with stratified random sampling with 
replacement, and the result is a representative sample of the non-agricultural private economy in 
the country.6  Stratification was based on three criteria: the sector of activity, firm size, and 
geographic location.7   
 For each country in the sample, we use the most recent survey available.  Consequently, 
this paper focuses on explaining cross-country differences in firm performance, but by 
controlling for industry effects we will focus on differences within specific industries.  With our 
primary focus on the manufacturing sector, we will mainly use the manufacturing sample of 
around 12000 firms.  The number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa is 32 (see the Appendix for 
the list of the SSA countries).8 Typically the stratified sampling yields 100 to 1000 firms per 
country. 
The WBES includes questions on various aspects of the business environment, including 
infrastructure, regulation burdens, corruption, and access to finance. The availability of these 
indicators about the business environment allows us to simultaneously control for various aspects 
of the business environment.  The survey has both objective and subjective measures of the 
                                                            
6 Thus wholly state-owned firms are not in the sample. 
7 See Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2011) for more detailed description of the WBES. 
8 In the data set, Ghana is included but we exclude it because we suspect the quality of the data is too poor—for 
instance, its labor productivity is almost always 400 log points higher.  We note that the data period for Ghana, 2007, 
was around the period that Ghana experienced currency rebasing.  We thank Margaret McMillan for pointing this 
out.   
7 
 
business environment.  In general we rely on objective measures to avoid endogeneity of firm 
responses. We avoid using the so-called subjective measures, which record a firm’s perceived 
obstacles to doing business. Only for questions related to crime do we use the subjective 
measures due to its importance in less developed countries and the lack of alternative data 
sources.   
For indicators of the business environment from WBES, we do not directly use individual 
answers because we believe they are endogenous. We thus use the local average of the business 
environment as a proxy for the local business environment (Dollar et al. 2005; Hallward-
Dreimeier et al. 2006; Aterido et al. forthcoming; Xu 2011).   In particular, we opt to rely on a 
city-industry-size cell as the basic unit for measuring the local business environment.  In 
computing the mean for a firm, the observation for the firm itself is excluded to avoid 
endogeneity.  The business environment has been shown to differ vastly across regions (Almeida 
and Carneiro 2009; Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 2010; Xu 2011) so we allow for a city-
specific dimension.  The literature also suggests that firms of various sizes face different 
business environments.  In particular, small firms are particularly vulnerable to expropriation 
(Beck et al. 2005; Cull and Xu 2005), so we allow the business environment to differ by size.  To 
implement the empirical strategy, we define a firm to be small (large) if the firm has fewer (more) 
number of employees than the median-sized firm of the city-industry cell.9   
We also rely on cross-country data to capture important elements of the business and 
political environment that the Enterprise Surveys do not measure, including elements such as 
geography, infrastructure, the political and institutional environment, and macroeconomic 
policies.  Aiming to be comprehensive, we combine measures of the business environment from 
                                                            
9 When the city-industry-size cell has fewer than 5 observations, we replace the cell mean with the city-industry 
mean as a proxy of the local business environment. 
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WBES with other measures of the political, institutional and business environment at the country 
level.  We describe below how we measure our key variables.    
Infrastructure.  Two related measures capture the extent of modern communication 
infrastructure: telephone density (from WDI indicators), and the local (i.e., city-industry-size) 
share of firms using websites for their businesses (based on WBES).  Since telephone density 
and local web intensity are closely correlated, and they both measure the use of modern 
telecommunication, we rely on factor analysis to obtain their principal factor, and call it 
Telecom.10   
Geography has been suggested as an important reason for Africa’s lack of development 
(Collier and Gunning 1999; Sachs and Warner 1997).  In particular, Africa has more landlocked 
countries, which heightens the need for coordination with neighboring countries. Given the 
significantly higher trade costs associated with borders, being landlocked necessarily impedes 
international trade.  Another somewhat subtle aspect of geography for Africa is its small 
population in general.  The low fertility of land and other aspects of geography imply that 
African countries tend to have sparsely populated land.  To capture the geographic elements 
above, we thus rely on (1) a dummy variable for whether a country is landlocked and (2) 
domestic market size, as proxied by country population.  We also explore in robustness tests the 
importance of natural resource endowments, such as the share of land in tropical areas. 
Political and institutional factors.  This category includes three political and 
institutional factors that might influence firm performance.  The first is ethnic fractionalization, a 
key feature that affects many formal and informal institutions in Africa (Easterly and Levine 
                                                            
10 One omission in our measure of infrastructure is the lack of road network data.  While the WDI has data on paved 
roads, the data are very unreliable.  For instance, India is said to have longer road network than China, a possibility 
that is instantly dismissed for anyone who has travelled to both countries.  The WDI road data simply do not capture 
the quality of roads well.  In contrast, the measures we adopt here make more sense in our judgment. 
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1997). Ethnic fractionalization has been suggested as an important explanation for poor African 
performance (see Collier and Gunning (1999) and Easterly and Levine (1997)).  
The second component is basic property rights protection. Cross-country evidence 
suggests that countries with worse property rights have lower aggregate investments, worse 
access to finance, and slower economic growth (North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1995; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2001). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find evidence that property rights 
institutions (i.e., those related to government expropriation) tend to be more important than 
contracting institutions (e.g., those safeguarding private transactions). Some new firm-level 
evidence also points to the importance of property rights (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 
2002; Cull and Xu 2005) and the adverse effects of corruption. Potential mechanisms for the 
property rights effects include better external finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998), 
better asset allocation (Claessens and Laeven 2003), and a higher share of large formal firms 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006). To capture the protection of property rights, we rely on political 
competition, in particular, the number of years that the ruling party has been in power from the 
Data of Political Institutions (DPI, based on Beck et al. 2001 and Keefer 2007).  Our reasoning is 
that the longer a ruling party has been in power, the more absolute power the ruling party has, 
and the higher the risk of unconstrained government expropriation. 11   There are clearly 
alternative explanation for this party monopoly variable.  For instance, a ruling party with 
                                                            
11 This intuition seems to capture the reality of most developing countries well.   However, some argue that several 
East-Asian countries also have low political competition as measured by this variable but seem to have performed 
well in the past several decades.  Gehlbach and Keefer (2010a, 2010b) suggests that this may be due to much better 
ruling party institutionalization in East Asian countries relative to other countries.  Institutionalized ruling parties 
facilitate development in autocratic countries for two main reasons.  First, they tend to have broad party bases so that 
the party represents broad rather than narrow constituent interest.  Second, there are institutionalized rules about 
removing incompetent or shirking party-leading rulers.  Thus the party can credibly commit to remove bad leaders, 
and leaders as a result work hard and perform well.  As Acemoglu and Johnson (2012) argue, an effective state 
machinery, that is, a bureaucracy that is effective and competent and has centralized power to tax and implement 
infrastructure investment, can bring about growth by itself, and the question is whether such growth are sustainable 
due to the lack of incentives for innovations. 
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monopoly power may behave like “stationary bandits” in contrast to “roving bandits”, and 
therefore internalize the benefits of providing a good business environment and property rights 
protection so that the party has a sustained economic payoff over the long run (Olsen 2000).  
This stationary bandit interpretation of party monopoly thus implies a positive effect on 
economic performance rather than the negative effect predicted by the expropriation-risk 
interpretation.  We shall thus allow the empirical results to distinguish between these two 
opposite interpretations.   
In later sensitivity checks, we also include alternative measures of protection of property 
rights, including voice and accountability, executive competition, and government size.  While 
the first two measures are clearly related to the protection of property rights of citizens from 
government expropriation, the size of government captures the de facto power of government, 
and could be viewed as de facto protection of property rights.12 
The third component of political and institutional factors is whether a country 
experienced any armed domestic conflicts in the previous ten years. This variable is related to the 
political structure of a country (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In countries with no strong 
centralized power, armed conflicts may develop as challengers attempt to grab power from 
incumbents by violence. To capture basic domestic safety, we use a dummy variable on whether 
domestic armed conflicts occurred in the past 10 years, based on Gleditsch et al. (2002) and 
updates of UCDP/PRIO (2010).    
Business environment.  The first element of business environment that we measure is 
the extent of corruption. We use the WBES measure of corruption which is the local average of 
                                                            
12 There are alternative interpretations for government size, but here we just mean to use it as a sensitivity check, and 
the key conclusions do not hinge on our classification. 
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bribes to the government normalized by firm sales.  This is directly comparable across countries, 
and avoids some of the flaws of subjective perceptions of corruption. Previous research has 
shown that firms in developing countries (such as Uganda and China) are hurt more by 
corruption than by taxation (Fisman and Svensson 2007; Cai, Fang and Xu 2011).  Since we 
have very few measures of crime across countries, we use one subjective measure from the 
dataset: firms were asked the extent to which they view crime as an obstacle to their expansion.  
We thus construct a variable called Obstacle_crime, which is the local share of firms that view 
crime as a moderate or major constraint.13 
The second element of the business environment that we measure is labor market 
flexibility.  Some recent studies suggest that stringent labor regulations can have serious adverse 
effects (Xu 2011). For instance, cumbersome labor regulations are associated with smaller firm 
size, more informality and higher unemployment in India and Brazil (Amin 2009a, Almeida and 
Carneiro 2009; Li, Mengistae and Xu 2011).  Minimum wages in Indonesia were found to have 
large negative effects on employment (Harrison and Scorse 2010). Labor market flexibility is 
proxied by an index of the difficulty of firing workers at the county level (Firing Difficulty 
hereafter) (Botero et al. 2004).   Firing Difficulty is an index measuring the cost of firing 20 
percent of a standardized firm’s workers (10% are fired for redundancy and 10% without cause). 
The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of severance pay and any mandatory 
penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements for a worker with three years of 
tenure with the firm.   
The third element of the business environment captures product market competition.  
Given the multifaceted nature of product market competition, we employ several measures to 
                                                            
13 The data set also has the share of sales lost due to theft and vandalism during transportation.   For manageability 
of table length, we do not include this variable in our list of explanatory variables.   
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capture this.  The first is the country-industry-year import tariff, a high level of which means 
lower international competition for domestic producers.  Related, a larger presence of foreign 
firms also represents stronger competition (see Aitken and Harrison 1999). Foreign firms in 
developing countries tend to be more productive, as shown later in this paper.  The third measure 
captures domestic country-industry level competition (“Competition_ind”), as measured by (1 – 
markupCI). MarkupCI is the country-industry average of firm-level markup (i.e., (value added – 
labor costs)/sales).  A higher value of Competition_ind implies more competition (Aghion et al. 
2005).  Fourth, in sensitivity checks, we also include a subjective measure of informal 
competition as well as the effect of entry barriers, proxied by the minimum capital required (% 
of income per capita) for starting a business (from Doing Business data set).  A higher ratio 
implies higher entry barriers and less competition.  
Access to finance.  There is a large literature on the linkages between access to finance 
and economic development (see Levine 1997).  While most of this literature focuses on access to 
formal finance such as bank loans and overdraft facilities, there is a growing literature that 
examines the impact of access to informal finance (Cull and Xu 2005).  Following this literature, 
we include access to both formal and informal finance, and investigate whether they have 
different effects on firm performance.  Access to formal finance is measured as the city-industry-
size share of firms with access to overdraft facilities, as in Dollar et al. (2005).  Access to 
informal finance is measured as the city-industry-size share of firms that grant trade credit (to 
other firms).14   
 
                                                            
14 We have also tried using the local share of firms receiving trade credit.  These two variables are, not surprisingly, 
very closely correlated.  This fact, coupled with the fact that the latter measure has significantly fewer observations, 
leads us to use the former trade credit measure in our empirical analysis. 
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III. How does Africa stack up against other countries?      
To examine African manufacturing performance, we include both static and dynamic 
measures of performance.  We compare both total factor productivity (TFP) and labor 
productivity (in logs).  Labor productivity is measured as sales (in constant 2005 U.S. dollars) 
divided by the number of employees.  TFP is derived from estimating an industry-specific 
production function and measured as the residual from such a production function.15   
To see Africa’s dynamic momentum, we also examine African firms’ labor productivity 
growth, sales growth and investment rates.  TFP levels (measured across countries) may not fully 
capture differences in productive efficiency since they may be affected by differences in 
markups and prices (Foster et al. 2008).  The advantage of using growth in labor productivity is 
that we can filter out the component of markup ratios and price differentials if they are relatively 
stable over a short time period.  Moreover, growth in labor productivity perhaps better captures 
the gains from improvements in efficiency over time, including those originating from 
technological and organizational efficiency, and increasing competition.16   
For both labor productivity and sales growth, we use growth during a three-year period 
since we only have data going back for three years at the firm level.  Following Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1995), we compute sales growth rates as (sales this year – sales three years 
                                                            
15 We later also allow for industry-income-level-specific technology, proceeding as follows. We classify all 
countries into 4 categories of income levels based on the quartiles of GDP per capita.  We allow for income-
category-industry specific coefficients for capital and labor for the value added production function.  We also 
include income-category-industry dummies to capture common income-category-industry productivity.   
         Capital is measured as replacement value of capital stock.  This is the only feasible measure of capital we can 
obtain from the data. It is perhaps useful to point out that our TFP measure is likely less reliable than the other 
performance measures. To measure capital reliably in any country is a daunting task, and to measure it consistently 
and reliably in 89 countries with differences in accounting systems and survey implementation is even more 
challenging.  The questionnaire designs tend to be the same across countries, but there are minor differences across 
countries and regions. 
16 While an even better measure would be the growth rate of TFP, the data set only asks sales and employment in the 
survey year and three years earlier, so that multiple observations of TFP cannot be computed.   
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ago)/average; labor productivity growth is constructed similarly.  To measure the exposure of 
African firms to global markets, we also compare firm-level export intensity, defined as the share 
of exports in total sales.  
Since our primary focus is to shed light on what determines the performance of non-rich 
African countries, we exclude from our SSA sample the richest four countries: South Africa, 
Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia, which have GDP per capita higher than 3000 US dollars (in 
2005 value).  The countries in our new African sample consist of all SSA sample countries that 
have GDP per capita lower than 3000 U.S. dollars (in 2005 value) at the time of each country’s 
survey.17  However, later in the paper we also report the results when including the four richest 
African countries. 
Evaluating African economic performance necessarily entails comparing Africa with 
other countries. We thus construct two comparison groups for Africa. The first, the average 
comparison group, consists of countries in non-SSA countries with per capita GDP lower than 
3000 U.S. dollars (in 2005 value).  The second, the better comparison group, consists of the top 
half countries of the average comparison group in terms of performance.  We measure country 
performance in the following way.  We first standardize each of the six performance measures so 
that each now has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.  We then add up the six 
standardized measures to form an aggregate performance measure.  Countries whose mean 
aggregate performance ranks in the top half of the average comparison group are defined to be 
members of the better comparison group. 
 
 
                                                            
17 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, we also exclude Ghana. 
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Mean Differences across African and non-African firms   
African manufacturing firms are 4 to 5 years younger than the two comparison groups 
(see Table 2). They have slightly lower state ownership but significantly higher foreign 
ownership, by 6 (4) percentage points relative to the average (better) comparison group.  They 
show higher ownership concentration, with the largest owner claiming 82 percent of firm 
ownership, higher than the average (better) comparison group by 8 (11) percentage points.  
African manufacturing firms are much smaller, with the log number of employees lower than the 
average (better) comparison groups by 72 (104) log points. 
Geography in Africa is characterized by a higher tendency to be landlocked and a smaller 
domestic market.  Africa is slightly more likely to be landlocked than the average comparison 
group (but this difference is statistically insignificant), but significantly more likely to be 
landlocked than the better comparison group (28 versus 8 percent).  African countries also have 
smaller populations, with the population of the average country lower by 67 (146) log points than 
those in the average (better) comparison group.  Furthermore, African countries (excluding the 
top four richest countries) still have much lower average GDP per capita at $497, about 1000 
dollars lower than both comparison groups.   
Africa displays stronger political monopoly—the logarithm of the number of years that 
the ruling party in an African country has been in power is greater by 51 (25) log points than the 
average (better) comparison group.  In addition, African firms have to confront violence and 
crime to a greater extent. In terms of the incidence of major or minor domestic conflicts in the 
previous 10 years, Africa has a higher tendency than the average comparison group (56 versus 41 
percent).  Surprisingly, the better-performing group actually has a similar past history of 
domestic conflicts.  Relatedly, Africa exhibits the highest level of ethnic diversity.  The ethnic 
16 
 
fractionalization (or diversity) in Africa, at 0.72, is much higher than the average (better) 
comparison group by 0.32 (0.37). 
Infrastructure in Africa is significantly worse, an outcome expected in light of its low 
income level. The telecom index is much lower in Africa than the two comparison groups.  The 
overall business environment clearly is worse in Africa than both comparison groups.  To begin 
with, African firms have to pay higher bribes to get things done.18  African firms’ average share 
of bribes to the government as a share of sales at 2.9 percent, is significantly higher than the 
average comparison group by 1.4 percentage points, and higher than the better comparison group 
by 1.8 percentage points.  The subjective perception of crime as a moderate or severe obstacle is 
higher for Africa. Africa also exhibits lower labor flexibility, with higher firing costs.  African 
firms also face less competition, both domestically and internationally.  The average industry-
level tariff rate in Africa, for instance, is about 50% higher than both comparison groups.  The 
country-industry level index of competition is also significantly lower in Africa than in both 
comparison groups.   
African firms also have worse access to finance, both formal and informal.  The local 
average share of firms with overdraft facilities is 23 percent, 22 (13) percentage points lower 
than the average (better) comparison group.19  Equally important, African firms also have less 
access to trade credit: the local share of firms granting trade credit is 27 percent, which is 27 
                                                            
18 This is very similar to the fact that firms in the poorer regions in China tend to spend more on entertainment costs 
(for government officials) in China (Cai et al. 2011).  
19 Note that the better comparison group actually has lower access to formal finance than the average comparison 
group, suggesting that access to formal finance is perhaps not crucial for firm performance for countries at low 
income levels. 
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percentage points lower than the average comparison group, and 30 percentage points lower than 
the better comparison group.20   
 To summarize, African firms face a more daunting business environment in almost all 
respects.  They operate in poorer, smaller economies that are more likely to be landlocked and 
they have inherited a history of armed conflict.  Infrastructure is much poorer, access to both 
trade credit and other forms of credit is lower, and regulatory barriers in the form of labor market 
regulations and other types of regulations are higher.  Political monopoly is more significant, 
tariffs are higher, and the payment of bribes is also higher.   Only the firm characteristics in our 
sample play a positive role, as the African firms in the sample are on average younger, and more 
likely to have foreign equity participation. 
 
Differences in (unconditional) firm performance   
 In this section, we report our comparison of the unconditional means for different 
measures of firm performance, including labor productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), sales 
growth, exports and investment.  Later in the paper, we will report the “conditional” performance 
for African firms, after controlling for observable characteristics of the environment.  Given the 
much more difficult environment faced by African firms as described above, we would expect 
poorer performance on the part of African firms in the unconditional means.   
For the average comparison group, Africa manufacturing firms have significantly worse 
outcomes for five out of our six performance measures.  Log labor productivity in Africa is 
lower by 48 log points (statistically significant).  Labor productivity growth is lower by 8.6 
                                                            
20 Note the rank order of trade credit prevalence corresponds to the order of firm performance, which suggests that 
trade credit may play an important role in explaining regional economic performance, a conjecture confirmed later. 
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percentage points, and TFP is lower by 33 log points. Sales growth is similar.  Export share is 
lower by 8.8 percentage points (statistically significant), with African firms exporting at only 
half the level of exports for the average comparison group.  Qualitatively consistent with a 
number of previous studies (Bisten et al. 1999, Gimah-Brempong and Traynor 1999, Devarajan 
et al. 1999),21 investment intensity in Africa is lower by 3.6 percentage points (14 versus 17.6 
percent).  
The difference with the better comparison group is more pronounced.  The labor 
productivity lag is at 77 log points, and the TFP lag is 53 log points.  While the sales growth 
difference remains insignificant, the labor productivity growth lag is 9.9 percentage points.  The 
export share is significantly lower by 13.3 percentage points, and the investment rate is 
significantly lower by 9.3 percentage points.  To summarize, relative to similar-income countries 
and the better comparison group, growth and productivity levels of formal manufacturing firms 
in African countries are across the board significantly behind (except in sales growth), and 
African firms exhibit much lower export capacity and investment levels.  
Determinants of firm performance (conditional differences)   
We now investigate how the business environment affects firm performance, and explore 
how African firms compare when we control for the external environment. The empirical 
specification is as follows: 
௜ܻ௖௝ ൌ ߙ	ܨ݅ݎ݉௜ ൅ 	ߚଵ	ܩ݁݋݃ݎܽ݌݄ݕ௖ ൅ ߚଶ	݂݅݊ݎܽݏݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௖௝ ൅ ߚଷܲ݋݈݅ܫ݊ݏݐ௖	 ൅ 
                              ߚସ	ܾݑݏ݅ܧ݊ݒ݅௖௝ ൅ ߚହ	݂݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݁௖௝ ൅ ݑ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௖௝                                                                                          (1)                              
                                                            
21 There is inconclusive evidence about whether investment in Africa is efficient.  Devarajan et al. (1999) argue for 
inefficiency based largely on cross-country data, while Gunning and Mengistae (2001) argue for efficiency based on 
firm-level African data. 
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where Y  is the firm performance indicator, and i, c, and j represent firm, country, and local 
levels. Y could be log labor productivity (or TFP), the labor productivity growth rate, the rate of 
sales growth, export intensity, or the investment rate.22 Firm is a set of basic firm-level controls 
including firm age, state and foreign ownership, and the ownership share of the largest owner. 
For the sales (labor productivity) growth rate equation we control for initial sales (labor 
productivity) three years ago to allow for regression toward the mean.  Geography includes log 
country population and a dummy equal to one for landlocked countries.  Infrastructure includes 
the telecom index (measured at the local, that is, the city-industry-size, level).  PoliInst 
represents the category of political and institutional factors, and includes log party years, any 
conflict in the past ten years, and ethnic fractionalization.  BusiEnvi indicates business 
environment consisting of firm-level foreign ownership, average country-industry foreign 
ownership, firing difficulty, the local average bribe, country-industry tariff levels, country-
industry competition index, and the average perceived level of crime at the local level. Finance 
includes the local share of firms having access to an overdraft facility, and the local average for 
access to trade credit.  We also include industry dummies, so that comparisons are between firms 
within the same sectors across countries.  The error term captures unobserved variables and 
measurement errors.23  Since the error terms within a country may be correlated due to omitted 
common factors or shocks, and many of our explanatory variables are aggregate variables, we 
                                                            
22 Log labor productivity is trimmed of tail one percent to avoid the outlier issue. Results are similar without 
trimming.   
23 Since we have many control variables, and the coverage of both the Enterprise Survey and cross-country sources 
differ for some countries, dropping the observations with any variable missing would result in the loss of the 
majority of the sample, and render our empirical exercises mush less representative.  For variables with significant 
number of missing observations, we thus resort to imputation, using the predicted value based on the following basic 
controls: the country-level urbanization level, the regional dummies (Africa, East Asia and Pacific, East Europe and 
Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa), the manufacturing dummy, and firm size dummies (10-20, 
20-60, and 60+ employees).  Why do we use the manufacturing dummy in imputation when our analysis largely 
focuses on the manufacturing subsample?  While we largely use the manufacturing subsample for most of analysis, 
we do use the service subsample in some sensitivity checks. 
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cluster the standard errors of each equation at the country level (Moulton 1990). We also report 
White standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity.  
The base results from equation (1) are reported in Table 4.  Once we control for firm 
characteristics and the business environment, the coefficient on the Africa dummy is positive and 
large for TFP (38 log points), labor productivity (76 log points), labor productivity growth (12 
percentage points), and sales growth (12 percentage points).  Thus conditional on our key 
variables, Africa does not lag behind in productivity and growth—in fact it is ahead of other 
regions. Taken at face value, if one could adjust the daunting list of geography, infrastructure, 
political, economic and institutional factors to the levels elsewhere, Africa possesses an inherent 
advantage.24 For export intensity and investment rates, the Africa dummy switches from negative 
and significant to merely insignificant. Whatever makes African firms lag behind can thus be 
fully explained by our control variables. 
Firm characteristics matter a great deal in explaining firm performance.  First, younger 
firms tend to have lower labor productivity but not TFP. The positive correlation between age 
and labor productivity is consistent with the conjecture that entrants learn in the initial years 
(SleuWaegen and Goedhuys 2002).  Younger firms also have lower labor productivity growth 
rates but higher investment rates.  Second, and maybe surprisingly, state ownership is positively 
and significantly associated with labor productivity, labor productivity growth, sales growth, and 
export share in value added.  This is surprising in light of the large literature that suggests that 
private ownership is superior in delivering firm performance (see Megginson and Netter (2001) 
for a summary).  But other evidence suggests that state owned enterprises could outperform 
                                                            
24 In this paper we do not have a measure of the extent of clustering.  Previous literature suggests that clustering may 
be important for explaining firm performance (see Long and Zhang 2011). 
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private enterprises when there is sufficient competition (Bartel and Harrison (2005)) or no strong 
monitoring mechanism associated with dispersed private ownership (Xu, Zhu and Lin 2005).25  
Also, state ownership is not significantly associated with higher TFP, which could indicate that 
labor productivity levels and growth rates are associated with higher capital investments on the 
part of the state.  Finally, a large ownership share of the largest owner is negatively related to 
labor productivity, labor productivity growth, sales growth, and export share.    
Geography and Infrastructure. Both measures of geography are mostly uncorrelated with 
firm growth or productivity levels.  A larger country (in terms of population) is associated with 
lower export intensity, consistent with the interpretation that large domestic markets as captured 
by population size typically have smaller export shares.  
The telecom index, our proxy of infrastructure, is positively and significantly associated 
with all measures of productivity, labor productivity and sales growth, and export intensity.  
Modern telecom infrastructure thus emerges as an important force behind enabling better firm 
performance, both in level and in growth.26   
Political and institutional factors. The number of years that the ruling party has been in 
power is negatively associated with TFP and labor productivity levels, but is statistically 
insignificant.  In contrast, this proxy for party monopoly is significantly correlated with labor 
productivity and sales growth rates.  The findings here are the opposite of the “stationary bandits” 
                                                            
25 Alternatively, the positive state effects could reflect selection bias—the state keeps the best assets for themselves, 
or such firms maintain more monopoly power in the market.   
26 One may wonder whether the results of telecom are due to the high correlation between telecom development and 
GDP per capita.  Indeed, their correlation is high at 0.81.  To assuage this concern, we control for income per capita 
in a sensitivity check (not reported).  Our key results remain intact.  Conditional African advantages become even 
larger: for TFP, 0.50; log labor productivity, 0.89; sales growth, 0.13; labor productivity growth, 0.14.  The 
magnitudes of telecom are slightly smaller in most cases but remain highly significant: for TFP, 0.30 (vs. 0.48 in 
base specification); log labor productivity, 0.59 (vs. 0.78), sales growth, 0.10 (vs. 0.12); labor productivity growth, 
0.11 (vs. 0.13); export share, 0.06 (vs. 0.03); investment rate, 0.07 (and significant at 1 percent level vs. 0.01 and 
insignificant).  Note that the telecom effects on export and investment become even more pronounced. 
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hypothesis which suggests that a long time horizon for rulers leads to better economic outcomes.  
Similarly, countries that experienced domestic conflicts in the previous ten years tend to have 
lower productivity and both growth rates, but the effects are statistically insignificant.   
Ethnic fractionalization has been suggested to have important adverse effects on macro 
outcomes (Easterly and Levine 1997; Collier and Gunning 1999a).  However, our micro 
evidence does not bear this out.  Indeed, ethnic fractionalization is robustly and positively 
correlated with labor productivity levels and growth. We cannot, of course, rule out the 
possibility that ethnic fractionalization has adverse effects through its indirect effects on other 
variables such as party monopoly, and that ethnic fractionalization adversely affect macro 
outcomes through the non-firm channels such as the provision of public goods. 
Business environment.  The local share of bribe payments in sales is negatively related to 
sales growth. This result is consistent with other studies in developing countries. The effect of 
crime, largely negative for most outcomes, is negative and significant only for export share.  One 
of the key components of managerial discretion, firing costs, is associated with higher TFP and 
labor productivity, which likely reflects the fact that managers hire fewer workers and substitute 
them with capital when firing costs are higher.  Firing costs are also associated with lower sales 
growth, which may reflect firms’ lower willingness to expand when it is difficult to reduce the 
number of workers if necessary.   
Foreign ownership has positive and significant effects on all outcomes except for the 
investment rate.  This can reflect a number of mechanisms such as better access to finance and/or 
technological and managerial know-how.  Foreign presence in an industry, as proxied by the 
share of foreign ownership within a country-industry cell, reduces investment rates (significantly) 
and labor productivity (insignificantly). This may reflect the market stealing effects of foreign 
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entry (Aitken and Harrison 1999).  We do, however, find positive spillover effects of foreign 
ownership on export shares, which is also consistent with Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997). 
Foreign presence in an industry is, therefore, positively associated with boosting export 
orientation, perhaps reflecting information sharing on export destinations and products.  Finally, 
our measure of domestic competition is significantly and positively associated with investment, 
but negatively and significantly associated with productivity levels and growth.  The negative 
correlation with productivity level could simply reflect the fact that our productivity measure 
contains price effects (Foster et al. 2008).  The negative correlation of productivity growth and 
competition could reflect the well-known Schumpeterian conjecture that a firm needs some 
monopoly rents for innovation and therefore productivity growth.   
Financial access. Access to bank finance (i.e., overdraft facilities) is positively correlated 
with TFP and labor productivity, yet it is also negatively correlated with export intensity.  The 
positive correlation of formal finance and productivity is consistent with the macro finance-
growth literature (Levine 1997).  The negative correlation with export intensity, somewhat 
puzzling, suggests that formal financing may encourage firms to focus more on the domestic 
market.27  Interestingly, the prevalence of trade credit has a stronger positive correlation with 
labor productivity, labor productivity growth, sales growth, and export intensity.  Thus, informal 
finance may have played a stronger role in facilitating local development in developing countries 
than formal finance.   
Alternative TFP Measure   
                                                            
27 One possibility is that with better access to formal finance, domestic firms can develop with less financial 
constraints, which then imply a less pull for foreign-owned firms who have comparative advantage in exporting. 
24 
 
As discussed earlier, our TFP measure is derived from estimating an industry-specific 
production function and measured as the residual from such a production function. 28  
Alternatively, we could allow for technology heterogeneity in a number of different ways.  In 
one sensitivity check, we classify countries into four income groups based on the income level, 
and we allow for income-level-industry-specific technology (i.e., factor shares).29 We obtain TFP 
as the residual in such a production function.   
 The results exploring this alternative specification for TFP are reported in Table 5.  The 
conditional advantage for Africa remains similar in magnitude (0.41 vs. 0.38), but becomes 
statistically insignificant.  Most of the point estimates are robust to this alternative specification, 
but statistical significance increases in some cases and declines in others.  Most of the results 
focusing on the importance of firm age, foreign ownership, and domestic competition remain 
intact.  The effect of party monopoly remains negative but becomes significant, while the 
importance of bribes switches from negative to positive.  The results thus seem to be sensitive to 
the choice of TFP estimators.  This is not surprising since in the more nuanced income-level-
industry-specific technology estimator, our estimates focus on within-income-group variations.  
Nevertheless, the key message that Africa’s disadvantage disappears when we control for 
infrastructure, access to credit, and the business environment remains intact.   
Do the large Africa premiums reflect multicollinearity?    
The large and positive conditional African premiums for TFP, labor productivity, labor 
productivity growth, and sales growth may surprise many.  Does the positive and significant 
coefficient for the Africa dummy merely reflect the close correlation of this dummy variable 
with some of the aggregate (national or local) variables?  Alternatively, could the positive Africa 
                                                            
28 In this paper, we only consider the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
29 And industry-income-level-specific intercept. 
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premium merely reflect the fact that some variables are endogenous and their inclusion in the 
regressions bias the estimates of the Africa dummy?  One solution is to leave out potential 
endogenous variables one at a time, and see if our estimate of the Africa effect is robust to these 
omissions. In Table 6, we run a series of regressions for each of the dependent variable, dropping 
one aggregate variable at a time, and ascertain that the Africa dummy always retains the same 
sign, and remains largely significant and with similar magnitudes in the TFP, labor productivity, 
labor productivity growth, and sales growth equations.    
Omitted variable bias     
As with any study using cross-sectional data, a legitimate concern is that the effects of 
our business environment variables may merely reflect those of omitted variables.  To consider 
this possibility, we examine the robustness of our key results when we include more controls.  In 
particular, we add more controls for openness, political and institutional factors, the business 
environment, and natural resource endowments.  First, we capture openness with a measure of 
imports and export as a share of GDP. Sachs and Warner (1997) find cross-country evidence that 
Africa’s disadvantage can be partly explained by the lack of openness.   
Second, we add more political and institutional factors, including voice and 
accountability from ICRG, executive competition from DPI, and government size to capture the 
de facto power of the government.30  We control for government size because we are concerned 
that the strong negative effects associated with political monopoly may merely capture the 
association of political monopoly with (the omitted) government macro policies.  Since the 
                                                            
30 Moreover, we have also tried adding inflation rate or a dummy variable of high inflation rate to proxy for macro 
risks, and have not found it matter.   
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negative effect of political monopoly may reflect other omitted governance variables, we also 
further control for “voice and accountability” and executive competition. 
Third, some argue that Africa is particularly affected by a “natural resource curse”.  Some 
economists have argued that SSA countries are more likely to be located in tropical areas, which 
have poorer quality of soil and a worse disease environment and are therefore bad for 
development (Sachs and Warner 1997).  Other economists have argued that countries with a 
heavy reliance on natural resource exports tend to have worse economic performance due to a 
number of reasons such as the lack of diversification.  To capture the natural resource curse, we 
include three measures: the share of land area in the tropics, the ratio of petroleum exports to 
GDP (lagged by one year), and the ratio of raw material exports to GDP, lagged by one year. 31   
Fourth, since the business environment is a large category that covers many aspects, we 
try to control for further subjective measures, including the local share of firms viewing the 
following as moderate or severe constraints: electricity, transport, informal competition, tax rate, 
land access, financial access, and labor regulation. Since entry barriers are particularly important 
(Klapper, Laeven and Rajan 2006), we also control for an objective measure of entry barrier, 
namely, the logarithm of minimum capital to start a business (from Doing Business).  
Overall, our results are generally robust (see Table 7). Africa’s advantage in TFP and 
labor productivity remain, with small changes in magnitude.  However, the African conditional 
disadvantage in export intensity becomes more pronounced, at 5 percent and significant. The 
positive effects of telecom and the negative effects of bribes become significant for investment 
rates. The negative effect of firing difficulty on productivity growth also becomes significant. 
The negative effects of political monopoly on productivity and sales growth rates remain 
                                                            
31 The first measure is from http://www.cid.ha, while the latter two are both from WDI of the World Bank. 
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qualitatively similar but less significant, not surprising since we are controlling for many 
aggregate governance variables closely correlated with party monopoly. 
The entry-barrier measure, the minimum capital to start a business, has a negative 
association with TFP, labor productivity and its growth rate, but a positive association with 
export intensity, perhaps because such entry barriers tend to foster large firms that have higher 
export capacity.32   We do not find that the two proxies of natural resources matter in a robust 
way.  Openness to trade is significantly associated with higher TFP and higher labor productivity, 
but tariffs have an insignificant impact. 
Adding four rich African countries 
So far our “Africa” consists of SSA countries excluding the four richest sub-Saharan 
countries (i.e., South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, and Botswana), all of which have GDP per 
capita exceeding 3000 U.S. dollars (in 2005 value).  Some may want to know how all of SSA is 
doing.  To shed light on this, in this section we define Africa to include the four rich SSA 
countries.  The results suggest that the conditional advantages of African firms drop significantly 
but do not disappear.  The coefficient on the Africa dummy remains positive for all outcomes but 
remains significant at the 1 percent level only for labor productivity growth.   The coefficients 
for the other variables are very similar, and some results become stronger—the negative effects 
of party monopoly on productivity are now significant, for instance. 33 Thus adding the four rich 
countries in fact reduces Africa’s conditional advantage.  Thus conditional advantages for Africa 
are stronger for the relatively poorer African countries. 
                                                            
32 Most of the locally-perceived constraint variables are not statistically significant, and often they are the wrong 
sign (results not reported in the table to save space). This is consistent with the perception that objective measures 
tend to out-perform subjective measures of the business environment (Dethier et al. 2008).   
33 The results are available upon request. 
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IV. Further Considerations   
In this section, we provide further sensitivity checks, and then investigate how the effects 
of the business environment differ in several key dimensions.  We want to understand whether 
African firms have a distinct conditional performance advantage depending on their industries 
and technologies. 
Manufacturing versus services 
So far we have focused on how African manufacturing firms fare relative to those in 
other regions.  However, do the results differ if we look at services?  Different sectors may rely 
to a greater degree on the political and business environment.  Since WBES has no good capital 
data for services, we cannot estimate TFP for services.  We thus focus on comparing the other 
five measures.  The results, in Table 8, indicate significant sector-level differences, and suggest 
that most of the business environment variables have stronger effects in manufacturing than in 
services. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that the conditional Africa advantage is large in 
manufacturing but non-existent in services.  Similarly, party monopoly significantly reduces 
growth in manufacturing but not in services. Since in developing countries manufacturing tends 
to out-perform services in productivity (McMillan and Rodrik 2011), one possible implication is 
that party monopoly might shift a country’s sector structure to less productive sectors, and lower 
a country’s overall allocation efficiency.  Interestingly, foreign ownership has no positive 
spillovers on exports in services but has significant spillovers in manufacturing.  The strong 
positive effects of ethnic fractionalization in manufacturing is much more muted in services. 
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In contrast, bribes seem to have more adverse effects for services, as seen in the negative 
and significant coefficients for labor productivity level and growth.  In addition, sales growth 
rates of service firms are more affected by the availability of formal finance than manufacturing 
firms.  
Low-tech and high-tech manufacturing      
Does the conditional African advantage differ by the level of sophistication of particular 
manufacturing industries?  This question is interesting since countries at different stages of 
development often display distinct areas of comparative advantage (Lin 2009, 2010; and Lin and 
Monga 2010), and industries with varying level of technological sophistication and specific 
investments may need different supporting institutions and business environments (Lin 2010). 
Since our sample African countries are largely located at the less sophisticated end of the 
technology spectrum, Africa’s comparative advantage likely is in low-tech rather than high-tech 
manufacturing.  We classify the manufacturing sectors as low-tech manufacturing if enterprises 
are in food and beverages, leather, wood processing and wood products, simple metal products, 
textiles, or garments.  We classify as high-tech manufacturing firms in metal and machinery, 
electronics, chemical and pharmaceutical products, non-metal and plastic, automobile and 
parts.34  
Table 9 shows that the conditional Africa advantage is indeed higher in low-tech 
manufacturing.  For labor productivity the Africa advantage is 88 log points for low-tech 
manufacturing, but 72 for high-tech manufacturing.  The conditional Africa advantages for labor 
productivity growth and for sales growth are larger and significant only for low-tech 
                                                            
34 The data set has “other manufacturing”, which is not classified as either since we don’t know its nature.   
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manufacturing, at around 15 percentage points in both cases.   Interestingly, the conditional 
Africa advantage in investment is higher for high-tech industries. 
The dependence on modern infrastructure is strong for both types of industries.  While 
party monopoly has adverse effects on productivity levels and growth for both low- and high-
tech industries, corruption is associated with a more adverse effect on high-tech than on low-tech 
manufacturing.  Similarly, crime has much more severe negative effects on high-tech than on 
low-tech manufacturing.      
Firing costs are associated with more adverse effects for high-tech than for low-tech 
manufacturing industries as well.  Finally, tariff promotion is only associated with positive 
effects in high tech industries—suggesting that trade incentives only work in promoting new, not 
existing areas of comparative advantage.  The importance of different industrial policy 
instruments for encouraging sectors with a “latent” comparative advantage is reviewed in 
Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010). 
Selection bias associated with the size of the informal sector 
So far we have found a large and positive conditional Africa premium in productivity, 
productivity growth and sales growth.  A concern is that the Africa premiums merely reflect 
selection bias.  In particular, only formal firms are present in our data.  Since it is possible that 
African countries have a relatively higher share of informal firms, and more able firms tend to 
self-select into the formal sector, then the African premiums may reflect a smaller group of high-
ability firms self-selecting into the formal sector. 
 This is a valid concern.  Shneider et al. (2010) offer estimates of the relative size of the 
informal sector in the whole economy for around 160 countries, and is the best data on informal 
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sector available.35 By this informality index (which captures the share of the informal sector in 
the whole economy), Africa does have a relatively high level of informality. Africa’s average of 
42.3 percent (ranging from 30.3 to 56.4 percent) is slightly above the average of 41.6 for the 
similar-income group (ranging from 15.1 to 66.1%), and the average of 37.3% for the non-Africa 
group (ranging from 15.1 to 66.1%).  To make sure that the non-African sample has a similar 
level of informality, we now retain the African sample and the non-African sample with the 
informality index overlapping with the African informality range, that is, from 30.3% to 56.4%.  
The results are reported in Table 10. 
  The conditional TFP advantage, which was statistically significant with a coefficient of 
0.38, now has a coefficient that is roughly 1/2 smaller, and is no longer significant. However, 
selection bias apparently cannot explain the overall pattern of conditional African premiums in 
other outcomes: the labor productivity premium increases from 0.76 to 0.83; the labor 
productivity growth premium from 12 to 19 percentage points, and the sales growth premium 
from 12 to 25 percentage points, all statistically significant.   
 There are several other notable findings.  First, the negative effects of party monopoly are 
slightly stronger in countries with higher informality. Second, telecom has even more 
pronounced effects in high-informality countries. Third, access to finance, both formal and 
informal, is less closely correlated with firm performance.  This is not surprising since the 
external finance needs for small and informal firms tend to be weaker due to less capacity and 
desire to expand. 
                                                            
35 Ayyagari et al. (2011) similarly relies on this informality index to address concern about selectivity based on 
informality.   
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 The overall patterns in Table 10 suggest that some forces of selection could explain a 
small part of the conditional African premiums, but that the selection story is far from the whole 
story.  The conditional African premiums in labor productivity, its growth, and sales growth 
remain intact and significant.  High-informality countries also limit the influence of finance, but 
amplify the influence of party monopoly and telecom. 
 
V. Explaining Africa’s Disadvantage    
We now examine why Africa falls behind the better comparison group—by reporting 
100* ߚ௑  (XAfrica – Xbetter)/Δy, the percentage of outcome differences attributable to the 
independent variables X.  Here y is the outcome variable, and “better” stands for the better 
comparison group.  ߚ௑   refers to the coefficient for a generic variable X. The coefficients are 
drawn from our baseline specification in Table 4.  XAfrica and Xbetter refer to the mean for Africa 
and for the better comparison group, and Δy refers to the outcome difference between Africa and 
the better comparison group. For simplicity, we only report the statistically significant and 
quantitatively important effects (i.e., accounting for more than 4% of the outcome difference in 
absolute value), and we only report those variables that are of policy concern.  The results are in 
Table 12.   
The key factors explaining Africa’s disadvantage are infrastructure, access to finance, 
and party monopoly.  Telecom, our proxy for infrastructure, is consistently the number one 
factor in explaining the African disadvantage: accounting for 114% of the 66 log points 
disadvantage in TFP, 142% of the 85 log points disadvantage in labor productivity, 172% of the 
12 percentage point disadvantage in labor productivity growth,  535% of the 3.4 percentage point 
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disadvantage in sales growth rate, and 40% of the 13.5 percentage point disadvantage in export 
share.36   
Finance, and mainly informal finance, is consistently the number two factor in explaining 
the African disadvantage—11% of the TFP disadvantage, half of the labor productivity 
disadvantage, 59% of labor productivity growth disadvantage, all of the sales growth 
disadvantage, and a quarter of the export share disadvantage. 
Party monopoly proves to be quantitatively important as well, accounting for about half 
of the labor productivity growth disadvantage, and about 130% of the sales growth disadvantage.  
Thus party monopoly proves to be a key deterrent of firm growth and productivity improvement. 
Two components of the business environment, corruption and firing difficulty, are 
important in accounting for sales growth, accounting for about 80% of the sales growth 
disadvantage.  But they do not affect other key performance measures.  So their importance pales 
in comparison with the tripod of infrastructure, finance and party monopoly. 
There are also several factors that contribute significantly to reduce Africa’s disadvantage.  
The foremost of them is ethnic fractionalization, which would contribute to African advantage in 
TFP of 20%, in labor productivity of 37%, and in labor productivity growth of 59 percent.    
Another key African advantage is lead in foreign ownership, which contributes to a 7% 
advantage in labor productivity growth, a 22% advantage in sales growth, and a 14% advantage 
in export share.    
 
 
                                                            
36 It is perhaps useful to point out here that the importance of telecom does not reflect its high correlation with GDP 
per capita, as pointed out earlier.   
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VI. Conclusions   
In this paper we use a comprehensive cross-country firm-level data to understand how 
formal African firms stack up against those in other regions.   We also explore whether Africa’s 
political and business environment can explain its performance shortfalls (if any), and what the 
key factors are for explaining Africa’s performance. We begin by comparing the unconditional 
means of various performance measures.  We find that formal African manufacturing firms show 
significant disadvantages in all measures of firm performance.  In the unconditional means, 
African firms exhibit lower total factor productivity (TFP) levels, lower labor productivity levels 
and growth rates, lower sales growth, and lower investment rates and export orientation. 
Once we control for key differences in firm characteristics, geography, infrastructure, 
political and institutional factors, business environment, and access to finance, Africa 
manufacturing firms actually exhibit a conditional advantage in productivity levels and growth, 
as well as sales growth.  This conditional advantage remains reasonably intact across a variety of 
robustness checks and additional specifications.   Most importantly, the negative and significant 
coefficient on the Africa dummy becomes either positive or insignificant when controlling for 
observable factors in the environment faced by these firms.   The implication is that African 
entrepreneurs are not inherently disadvantaged.  In light of the highly challenging environment, 
they actually perform better than those in other regions of the world at similar income levels. 
The conditional advantage for African firms is higher in low-tech than in high-tech 
manufacturing, and in manufacturing than in services. The key factors in explaining Africa’s 
disadvantage in firm performance relative to better-performing similar income countries are 
infrastructure, lack of access to finance and political monopoly.  The impacts of telecom and 
finance, especially informal finance, are felt across the board.  In contract, the damages of party 
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monopoly are mostly revealed in dynamic performance measures such as productivity growth.  
Some elements of business environment, mainly labor regulation and corruption, also have   
effects.  Some other elements often viewed as important in the literature, in contrast, do not 
matter much:  geography proves to be unimportant, as are crime, tariffs, and domestic conflict.  
Not surprisingly, higher foreign participation has helped Africa consistently. We also obtain 
some findings that suggest that different policies have distinct implications for structural change.  
Telecom development, for instance, helps manufacturing and services about equally, and helps 
low- and high-tech manufacturing about equally, and is therefore sector-neutral.  In contrast, 
development of banking helps services more than manufacturing, and corruption hurts services 
more than manufacturing.  Some tariff protection helps high tech manufacturing but not low-tech 
manufacturing.   Party monopoly hurts manufacturing much more than services.  Since 
manufacturing as a sector has relatively high productivity growth in developing countries 
(McMillan and Rodrik 2011), party monopoly may hurt development by lowering manufacturing 
productivity levels and growth.   
 The findings in this paper have direct policy implications.  The first implication is 
somewhat optimistic for Africa.  The results indicate that conditional on the political and 
business environment, African firms actually have advantages in their productivity levels, 
productivity growth rates, and sales growth rates—at least no disadvantage relative to other 
countries with similar GDP per capita.  So there is no inherent Africa “curse” that hinders its 
development; only a need for action to address the poor political and business environment.  This 
is consistent with Africa’s growth record before the 1970s and the growth record in the past 
decade.   
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Second, our results show that the key factors that affect African manufacturing firms are  
infrastructure, access to finance, and party competition.  What is especially important in terms of 
improving financing is to facilitate inter-firm trust and contracting so that trade credit is easily 
extended.  Since these key variables are mostly related to the functions of the state, reforms to 
the state are likely to have the largest effects in improving African competitiveness.  
This research suggests that there are several ways for African firms to shift gears and 
move towards a positive reinforcing cycle of development.  Given the paramount importance of 
infrastructure, how to develop Africa’s infrastructure remains a key policy challenge.  To 
increase access to finance and especially trade finance, complementary institutions such as 
contract enforcement mechanisms for trade credit disputes could be considered.  Given the key 
importance of reducing party monopoly for our results, political competition and accountability 
would be the critical factor for inducing better firm performance.  Finally, foreign ownership has 
yielded positive benefits across the board.  This suggests that additional foreign entry would 
improve competitiveness and promote development.   
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Table 1.  Definition of variables 
Variable Definitions 
TFP Total factor productivity.  
ln(LP) Log(sales per worker). From the Enterprise Survey of the World Bank. 
LP growth (Three-year) labor productivity growth rate at the firm level, computed as (labor productivity this 
year – labor productivity three years ago)/average. All monetary values are in this paper is in 
constant U.S. dollars in 2005.   
Sales Growth (Three-year) sales growth rate at the firm level, computed as (sales this year – sales three years ago)/ 
average.  
Export  share Export value over sales.   
Inv/VA The value of investment over total value added for a firm.  Investment is the sum of new purchases in 
equipment and land.  Trimed of tail one percent. 
lnL The logarithm of the number of employees.   
Firm age Firm age.  
Foreign The share of foreign ownership.  
Ind avg Foreign Country-industry (employment-weighted) average of foreign ownership. 
Ownership largest The ownership share of the largest owner of the firm.  
GDP per capita GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars.  From WDI. 
Ln(population) Log of the population of the country.  From WDI. 
Trade The ratio of the sum of the values of imports and exports over GDP.  From WDI. 
govConsumption/GDP The ratio of total government consumption over GDP.  From WDI. 
Landlock The dummy variable indicating that a country is landlocked. 
Share of land in tropics The share of land areas in Koeppen-Geiger tropics, from http://www.cid.ha. 
Voice and 
accountability 
The index of voice and accountability, measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. From ICRG. 
Ln(partyYears) Logarithm of the number of years that the ruling party has been in power, from DPI (Beck et al. 
2001; Keefer 2007). 
Any Conflict The dummy variable of any domestic armed conflicts in the previous 10 years, from Gleditsch et al. 
(2002) and UCDP/PRIO (2010). 
EthnicFrac Ethnic fractionalization, a larger value implies more ethnic diversity, from WDI. 
Firing difficulty An index measuring the cost of firing 20 percent of the firm’s workers (10% are fired for redundancy 
and 10% without cause). The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of the notice period, 
severance pay, and any mandatory penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements 
for a worker with three years of tenure with the firm.  Based on Doing Business (Botero et al. 2004). 
Executive competition An index measuring the competition for the executive branch of the government, from DPI (Beck et 
al. 2001; Keefer 2007).   
Min capital to start 
business 
A proxy for entry barriers, the minimum capital required (% of income per capita) for starting a 
business, from Doing Business of World Bank.  
Telecom The principal factor for two telecom-related variables: (i) log of the number of mainline phones per 
10000 inhabitants in a country (from WDI); (ii) the city-industry-size share of firms using website for 
business (from the Enterprise Survey).  Size is defined as large and small based on whether the firm 
is above or below the median of the cell.  When the cell size falls below 5 firms, we use the city-
industry mean instead.  All proxies for business environment based on firm answers are dealt with in 
the same way as here. 
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Table 1.  Definition of variables (Cont’d)  
Variable Definitions 
Bribe The city-industry-size average of the share of bribes to government divided by sales.  
Bank The city-industry-size share of firms having access to overdraft facility, as a proxy of 
access to formal finance. 
Trade Credit The city-industry-size average of the share of output sold in the form of supplier credit, as a 
proxy for local access to informal finance. 
Competition_ind The Lerner index of competition, constructed as (1 – markupCI), and markupCI is the 
country-industry average of firm-level markup.   Firm-level markup is computed as (value 
added – labor costs)/sales.  A larger value implies greater competition. 
Tariff Country-industry-year level of import tariffs.   
Obstacle_crime  The city-industry-size share of firms that view crime as a moderate or severe constraint.   
Obstacle_InformalCompete The city-industry-size share of firms viewing “practices of competitors in the informal 
sector” as a serious obstacle.   
Obstacle_landAccess The city-industry-size share of local firms that view access to land as a moderate or severe 
constraint.    
Obstacle_electricity The city-industry-size share of firms that view electricity access as a moderate or severe 
constraint.   
Obstacle_transport The city-industry-size share of firms that view transport as a moderate or severe constraint.  
Obstacle_tax The city-industry-size share of firms that view tax burdens as a moderate or severe 
constraint.   
Obstacle_finance The city-industry-size share of firms that view finance access and costs as a moderate or 
severe constraint.   
Obstacle_laborRegulation The city-industry-size share of firms that view labor regulation as a moderate or severe 
constraint.   
Petroleum export/GDPt-1 The ratio of petroleum exports to GDP, lagged by one year, from WDI. 
Raw material export/GDPt-1 The ratio of raw material exports to GDP, lagged by one year, from WDI. 
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                       Table 2.  Differences between Africa and the Two Comparison Groups  
 
Variable  T-test for median difference 
 Africa Africa – the average comparison 
group 
Africa – the better 
comparison group 
Performance measures    
    TFP -0.585 -0.329** (0.043) -0.525*** (0.052) 
    ln(LP) 8.792 -0.483*** (0.030) -0.769*** (0.035) 
    LP growth -0.115 -0.086*** (0.015) -0.099*** (0.017) 
    Sales Growth  0.066 -0.009 (0.015) -0.010 (0.017) 
    Export Share 0.073 -0.088*** (0.006) -0.133*** (0.007) 
    Investment/Value-added 0.140 -0.036*** (0.009) -0.093*** (0.011) 
Firm characteristics    
    lnL 2.937 -0.720*** (0.026) -1.043*** (0.030) 
    Firm age  12.667 -5.344*** (0.313) -3.795*** (0.348) 
    State ownership 0.007 -0.004*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.002) 
    Ownership largest 0.820 0.080*** (0.006) 0.112*** (0.007) 
Basic country characteristics and geography   
    GDP per capita 497.408 -1051.850*** (14.546) -1047.308*** (15.626) 
    Ln(pop) 16.067 -0.669*** (0.025) -1.461*** (0.026) 
    Landlock 0.278 0.034** (0.009） 0.197*** (0.008) 
Infrastructure    
    Telecom -1.278 -1.333*** (0.011) -1.563*** (0.012) 
Political and institutional factors    
    Ln(partyYears) 2.571 0.507*** (0.024) 0.252*** (0.026) 
    Any Conflict 0.561 0.152*** (0.009) 0.013 (0.011) 
    EthnicFrac 0.715 0.315*** (0.004) 0.373*** (0.004) 
Business environment    
    Foreign 0.163 0.064*** (0.006) 0.044*** (0.007) 
    Bribe 0.029 0.014*** (0.0006) 0.018*** (0.0005) 
    Obstacle_crime 0.397 0.091*** (0.004) 0.093*** (0.005) 
    FireCosts 0.389 0.082*** (0.004) 0.016*** (0.004) 
    Competition_ind 0.588 -0.028*** (0.003) -0.034*** (0.003) 
    Tariff 0.144 0.052*** (0.002) 0.051*** (0.002) 
Finance     
    Bank 0.232 -0.222*** (0.005) -0.129*** (0.005) 
    Trade credit 0.270 -0.270*** (0.004) -0.299*** (0.005) 
Notes: One-sided test.     The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
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Table 3. Industry distribution for Africa, the Average Comparison Group, and the Better Comparison Group  
 
Poor Africa 
(without the four rich 
countries) 
Average Comparison 
Group 
Better  Comparison 
Group 
Textiles 0.020 0.066 0.050 
Garments 0.120 0.164 0.174 
Metal & Machinery 0.065 0.105 0.170 
Electronics 0.007 0.027 0.045 
Chemical, pharmaceutical 0.040 0.104 0.086 
Wood and furniture 0.021 0.023 0.023 
Non-metal and plastic 0.041 0.103 0.132 
Automobiles and parts 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Other manufacturing 0.451 0.174 0.111 
Notes: Manufacturing sample only. 
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Table 4. Explaining Firm Performance, OLS results  
 TFP Ln(Labor Productivity) 
 
Labor Productivity 
Growth 
Sales Growth Export Share Investment/VA 
 coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
Poor Africa 0.377** 0.189 0.762*** 0.279 0.122* 0.066 0.121* 0.069 -0.019 0.039 0.015 0.040 
Firm characteristics    
   Ln(firm age) -0.059*** 0.023 0.119*** 0.023 0.044*** 0.009 -0.019 0.012 0.001 0.004 -0.025*** 0.005 
   State Ownership  0.548 0.349 0.706*** 0.199 0.241** 0.094 0.296*** 0.096 0.174*** 0.054 0.139 0.085 
   Ownership largest -0.019 0.087 -0.279** 0.126 -0.088*** 0.032 -0.123*** 0.030 -0.047** 0.018 0.001 0.014 
   Ln(labor productivity 3 years ago)   -0.191*** 0.020  
   Ln(sales 3 years ago)   -0.093*** 0.007 
Geography    
   Ln(population) 0.073 0.094 0.152 0.137 0.020 0.031 0.013 0.027 -0.031*** 0.007 -0.001 0.009 
   Landlock -0.145 0.197 0.071 0.271 -0.041 0.073 -0.061 0.077 -0.014 0.016 0.039** 0.019 
Infrastructure    
   Telecom 0.485*** 0.086 0.777*** 0.105 0.131*** 0.039 0.117*** 0.041 0.034** 0.016 0.013 0.018 
Political and institutional factors    
   Ln(party years)  -0.148 0.094 -0.154 0.138 -0.090** 0.039 -0.074* 0.042 -0.005 0.011 0.002 0.012 
   Any conflict in past 10 years -0.130 0.159 -0.311 0.257 -0.089 0.066 -0.050 0.070 0.032 0.021 -0.031 0.023 
   Ethnic fractionalization 0.350* 0.204 0.838*** 0.301 0.189** 0.085 0.155 0.103 -0.047 0.039 -0.041 0.041 
Business environment    
   Foreign 0.336*** 0.082 0.719*** 0.074 0.184*** 0.027 0.173*** 0.030 0.204*** 0.030 -0.004 0.010 
   Bribe -1.796 1.481 -1.445 1.879 -0.759 0.607 -1.233** 0.624 -0.117 0.266 -0.091 0.305 
   Obstacle_crime  0.231 0.265 -0.011 0.478 -0.112 0.094 -0.093 0.088 -0.101*** 0.036 -0.063 0.048 
   Firing difficulty 0.814*** 0.277 0.877** 0.389 -0.093 0.096 -0.269*** 0.103 -0.014 0.035 -0.005 0.042 
   Competition_ind -2.431*** 0.371 -0.876** 0.354 -0.255*** 0.090 -0.106 0.090 0.036 0.044 0.159*** 0.055 
   Tariff 0.336 0.415 0.314 0.584 0.192 0.175 0.308 0.192 0.133 0.168 0.028 0.112 
   Country-industry Average of   
   foreign -0.013 0.241 -0.524 0.363 -0.009 0.081 0.088 0.082 0.185*** 0.042 -0.094*** 0.035 
Finance    
   Bank 0.557*** 0.173 0.587*** 0.218 0.110 0.070 0.083 0.084 -0.072** 0.032 -0.032 0.044 
   Trade credit 0.158 0.261 0.898** 0.390 0.260*** 0.094 0.188* 0.102 0.163*** 0.039 0.076 0.048 
N observations 9,770 12,764 10,482 10,729 13,818 10,002 
R square adjusted 0.127 0.338 0.243 0.135 0.162 0.024 
Notes:  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.    White standard errors, clustered at the country level.  Coefficients for industry dummies not 
reported.
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Table 5: Sensitivity checks with respect to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measure  
 
 
Industry technology 
(Basic Specification from Table 4) Income-category-ind tech 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Poor Africa 0.377** 0.189 0.405 0.266 
Firm Characteristics  
     Ln(firm age) -0.059*** 0.023 -0.046 0.029 
    State ownership 0.548 0.349 0.854* 0.442 
    Ownership largest -0.019 0.087 -0.097 0.093 
Geography 
    Ln(population) 0.073 0.094 0.137 0.116 
    Landlock  -0.145 0.197 0.161 0.273 
Infrastructure 
    Telecom 0.485*** 0.086 0.131 0.111 
Political and institutional factors 
    Ln(party years) -0.148 0.094 -0.277* 0.144 
    Any conflicts in 10 years -0.130 0.159 -0.426* 0.249 
    Ethnic fractionalization 0.350* 0.204 -0.015 0.361 
Business environment 
    Bribe -1.796 1.481 4.913*** 1.758 
    Obstacle_crime 0.231 0.265 -0.280 0.392 
    Firing difficulty 0.814*** 0.277 0.498 0.475 
    Comeptition_ind -2.431*** 0.371 -2.301*** 0.613 
    Tariff 0.336 0.415 0.745 0.547 
    Foreign 0.336*** 0.082 0.431*** 0.095 
    Country-industry avg of foreign -0.013 0.241 0.093 0.386 
finance 
    Bank 0.557*** 0.173 0.256 0.298 
    Trade credit 0.158 0.261 0.040 0.437 
 
 
N 
 
 
9,770 
 
 
9,770 
R-Square Adjusted 0.127 0.054 
Notes:  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.    White standard errors, clustered at the  
country level.  Coefficients for industry dummies not reported.    
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                                      Table 6.   The coefficient for Africa When Dropping One Explanatory Variable at a Time  
 TFP 
Ln(labor 
productivity) 
Labor 
productivity 
growth 
Sales 
Growth 
Export  
Share 
Investment/ 
Value added 
Base (no dropping) 0.377** 0.189 0.762*** 0.279 0.122* 0.066 0.121* 0.069 -0.019 0.039 0.015 0.040 
When dropping:   
Ln(firm age) 0.376* 0.192 0.733*** 0.276 0.114* 0.065 0.119* 0.068 -0.017 0.039 0.022 0.040 
State  0.374** 0.190 0.760*** 0.279 0.121* 0.066 0.120* 0.069 -0.018 0.039 0.015 0.040 
Ln(population) 0.317* 0.167 0.648*** 0.237 0.107 0.067 0.111 0.071 0.002 0.038 0.013 0.041 
Ln(party years) 0.241 0.155 0.622*** 0.211 0.040 0.064 0.054 0.076 -0.023 0.036 0.017 0.036 
Any conflicts in 10 years 0.336** 0.170 0.667*** 0.251 0.096 0.068 0.107 0.071 -0.008 0.040 0.007 0.040 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.457** 0.206 0.959*** 0.318 0.167** 0.072 0.158** 0.073 -0.030 0.037 0.006 0.038 
telecom 0.178 0.205 0.429 0.307 0.064 0.065 0.071 0.064 -0.033 0.036 0.010 0.037 
Foreign  0.402** 0.193 0.807*** 0.286 0.130* 0.067 0.126* 0.069 -0.005 0.039 0.015 0.040 
Country-ind avg of foreign 0.376** 0.183 0.735*** 0.273 0.122* 0.065 0.126* 0.070 -0.009 0.040 0.011 0.040 
Firing difficulties 0.296 0.204 0.680** 0.278 0.129** 0.065 0.146** 0.072 -0.016 0.041 0.017 0.041 
Bribe  0.362* 0.191 0.754*** 0.284 0.117* 0.067 0.112 0.070 -0.019 0.039 0.015 0.040 
Crime  0.336* 0.198 0.762*** 0.288 0.132* 0.069 0.129* 0.069 -0.007 0.043 0.020 0.042 
Bank 0.389** 0.196 0.756*** 0.277 0.125* 0.066 0.124* 0.069 -0.018 0.040 0.015 0.040 
Trade credit 0.364** 0.178 0.690*** 0.267 0.100 0.065 0.105 0.071 -0.032 0.040 0.010 0.041 
 
Notes:  Each row reports the coefficient or standard error of the (poor) Africa dummy for all the outcome equations.  For the “base” row, no variables are dropped.  For 
row “x”, only “x” is dropped from the list of explanatory variables.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. White standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. 
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Table 7:  Sensitivity checks with Additional Controls   
 TFP Ln(labor prod.) 
 
Labor Productivity 
Growth 
Sales Growth Export Share Investment/Value Added 
Poor Africa 0.301* 0.174 0.716*** 0.215 0.146** 0.069 0.110 0.070 -0.050* 0.030 -0.035 0.029 
Geography: ln(population) 0.164*** 0.050 0.202** 0.086 0.016 0.019 -0.012 0.020 -0.030*** 0.008 -0.008 0.009 
                    landlock -0.327** 0.155 -0.219 0.172 -0.135** 0.054 -0.152** 0.075 0.005 0.019 0.033 0.021 
Infrastructure:  Telecom 0.188** 0.090 0.522*** 0.145 0.112** 0.048 0.117** 0.046 0.044** 0.017 0.035* 0.018 
Poli. and inst.:    ln(party years) -0.103 0.072 -0.137 0.103 -0.063** 0.027 -0.046 0.029 -0.002 0.009 0.003 0.009 
                    Any conflicts in 10 years 0.118 0.113 0.019 0.177 -0.002 0.045 -0.003 0.055 0.001 0.020 -0.065*** 0.022 
                    Ethnic fractionalization 0.158 0.209 0.743** 0.340 0.248** 0.108 0.234* 0.127 0.007 0.026 0.058 0.038 
Business environment: Bribe  -0.517 1.308 0.391 1.548 -0.370 0.360 -0.998* 0.516 -0.308 0.192 -0.537** 0.230 
                    Obstacle_crime -0.489*** 0.184 -0.709*** 0.267 -0.264*** 0.063 -0.168** 0.071 -0.091*** 0.032 -0.048 0.037 
                    Firing difficulty 0.004 0.230 0.056 0.288 -0.179** 0.091 -0.285** 0.116 0.012 0.040 0.030 0.040 
                    Competition_Ind -2.635*** 0.368 -1.115*** 0.237 -0.368*** 0.076 -0.169** 0.082 0.109*** 0.039 0.179*** 0.046 
                    Tariff  0.575* 0.333 0.317 0.360 0.129 0.162 0.218 0.168 0.057 0.138 -0.098 0.079 
                    Foreign 0.395*** 0.076 0.715*** 0.072 0.194*** 0.028 0.182*** 0.030 0.214*** 0.031 -0.008 0.010 
                    Country-ind avg foreign 0.132 0.194 -0.480** 0.245 -0.026 0.065 0.078 0.066 0.196*** 0.040 -0.065 0.041 
Finance:     Bank  0.453*** 0.158 0.323 0.270 0.049 0.079 0.007 0.081 -0.067*** 0.024 -0.052 0.037 
                    Trade credit 0.088 0.180 0.733*** 0.216 0.152** 0.067 0.110 0.068 0.178*** 0.043 0.103** 0.041 
Openness:  Trade 0.006*** 0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
More poli./inst.: voice & accountability 0.455*** 0.123 0.487*** 0.160 0.139*** 0.052 0.020 0.059 -0.092*** 0.019 -0.089*** 0.022 
                    Executive competition -0.041 0.057 -0.116* 0.064 -0.044 0.027 -0.028 0.033 0.014* 0.007 -0.007 0.010 
                    Government size 0.036*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.015 0.006* 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Natural resource: petro. exp/GDP lagged 2.063 1.336 2.290 1.888 1.180* 0.614 0.834 0.685 -0.358* 0.202 -0.447 0.384 
                    Raw material exp/GDP lagged -1.604** 0.674 -1.357 1.031 -0.024 0.440 -0.153 0.533 -0.139 0.091 0.262 0.226 
                    Share of land in tropics -0.322* 0.185 -0.382 0.309 -0.009 0.070 -0.038 0.062 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.020 
More business environment:     
                    Ln(min capital to start busi.) -0.048* 0.029 -0.105** 0.043 -0.019* 0.010 -0.008 0.011 0.014*** 0.004 0.003 0.004 
More subjective bus env controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls, industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 8,700 11,236 9,325 9,545 12,165 8,828 
R-Square Adjusted 0.163 0.411 0.246 0.132 0.182 0.043 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  Intercept not reported.  White standard errors are clustered at the country level.    For all equations 
we also control for all firm characteristics, and subjective indicators of the business environment (including average local obstacle scores in electricity, transportation, informal competition, 
tax rate, land administration, financial access, and labor regulation) . For simplicity, we do not report them here. 
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Table 8. Services only  
 
Ln(labor 
productivity) 
Labor productivity 
Growth 
Sales  
Growth 
Export 
Share 
Investment/ 
Value added 
Poor Africa 0.219 0.209 0.019 0.063 0.042 0.063 -0.003 0.011 -0.010 0.017 
Firm characteristics 
   Ln(firm age) 0.098*** 0.027 0.032** 0.014 -0.020 0.015 0.008*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.006 
   State  -0.165 0.182 0.172 0.112 0.231** 0.108 0.030 0.025 0.058 0.088 
    Ownership largest -0.054 0.115 0.023 0.035 -0.006 0.035 -0.003 0.007 -0.001 0.018 
    Ln(sales 3 years ago) -0.104*** 0.008 
    Ln(LP 3 years ago) -0.192*** 0.013 
Geography 
   Ln(population) 0.048 0.075 0.005 0.018 0.004 0.017 -0.010*** 0.003 -0.000 0.005 
   Landlock 0.178 0.203 0.028 0.055 -0.016 0.056 -0.013* 0.007 0.028** 0.014 
Infrastructure  
   Telecom 0.683*** 0.122 0.154*** 0.037 0.119*** 0.038 0.008 0.006 -0.032*** 0.012 
Political and institutional factors 
   Ln(party years)  -0.054 0.100 -0.035 0.030 -0.017 0.032 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.007 
   Any conflict in past 10 years -0.121 0.176 -0.026 0.046 0.011 0.050 0.010 0.009 -0.015 0.013 
   Ethnic fractionalization 0.508* 0.261 0.035 0.078 0.048 0.078 0.019 0.014 -0.053* 0.030 
Business environment  
   Bribe -3.794* 1.936 -1.961*** 0.670 -2.029*** 0.743 0.142 0.130 -0.245 0.188 
   Obstacle_crime  0.065 0.312 0.024 0.070 -0.037 0.065 -0.006 0.016 -0.024 0.025 
   Firing difficulty 0.818** 0.393 0.106 0.113 -0.065 0.108 -0.003 0.016 -0.003 0.028 
   Competition_ind -0.254 0.407 0.048 0.120 0.142 0.111 0.023 0.017 0.093 0.060 
   Tariff 0.742 1.704 0.226 0.546 -0.654 0.618 0.022 0.116 -0.662* 0.400 
   Foreign 0.725*** 0.087 0.171*** 0.029 0.183*** 0.031 0.057*** 0.011 0.013 0.013 
   Country-industry avg of foreign 0.000 0.328 -0.025 0.087 0.070 0.090 -0.000 0.019 0.029 0.031 
Finance  
   Bank 0.661*** 0.228 0.167** 0.076 0.228*** 0.082 0.004 0.020 0.002 0.029 
   Trade credit 0.969*** 0.347 0.193** 0.097 0.105 0.104 0.072*** 0.024 -0.002 0.035 
N 8,930 7,177 7,352 9,901 6,004 
R-Square Adjusted 0.293 0.220 0.120 0.043 0.021 
 Notes:  *, **, and ***: statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  White standard errors are clustered at the country level.  Industry dummies also controlled for. 
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                                                      Table 9: Determinants of Firm Performance by Industry Sophistication    
 Low-Tech Manufacturing High Ttech Manufacturing 
 TFP Ln(LP) LP gr. Sale gr. Exp. Sh. Inv/VA TFP Ln(LP) LP gr. Sale gr. Exp. Sh. Inv/VA 
Poor Africa  0.211 0.879*** 0.141* 0.150* -0.071 0.005 0.465 0.719** 0.062 0.059 0.053 0.099** 
 (0.207) (0.277) (0.072) (0.083) (0.049) (0.049) (0.310) (0.363) (0.086) (0.075) (0.047) (0.049) 
Geography       
Ln(population) 0.074 0.159 0.010 -0.005 -0.036*** -0.002 0.207* 0.272** 0.031 0.021 -0.024*** 0.006 
 (0.087) (0.145) (0.032) (0.027) (0.009) (0.011) (0.125) (0.137) (0.030) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) 
Landlock  -0.412** -0.091 -0.071 -0.058 0.006 0.080*** 0.144 0.290 -0.069 -0.131 0.006 0.022 
 (0.200) (0.280) (0.074) (0.076) (0.023) (0.025) (0.267) (0.276) (0.075) (0.085) (0.023) (0.026) 
Infrastructure       
Telecom 0.343*** 0.757*** 0.165*** 0.146*** 0.022 0.022 0.368** 0.701*** 0.124** 0.142*** 0.057*** 0.027 
 (0.099) (0.136) (0.044) (0.041) (0.029) (0.028) (0.149) (0.157) (0.053) (0.054) (0.021) (0.018) 
Poli & inst.        
Ln(party years)  -0.144* -0.243* -0.085** -0.060 0.012 0.007 -0.335** -0.172 -0.074* -0.049 -0.011 0.013 
 (0.084) (0.146) (0.039) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) (0.137) (0.122) (0.040) (0.044) (0.013) (0.015) 
Any conflicts in 10  -0.092 -0.331 -0.055 0.010 0.049* -0.023 -0.351 -0.378 -0.037 -0.009 0.025 -0.031 
      yrs (0.145) (0.271) (0.064) (0.065) (0.027) (0.025) (0.228) (0.241) (0.058) (0.064) (0.028) (0.027) 
Ethnic frac. 0.366 0.680* 0.257** 0.203* 0.003 0.009 -0.403 0.615** 0.178** 0.266** -0.101** -0.120** 
 (0.224) (0.347) (0.105) (0.115) (0.060) (0.047) (0.346) (0.304) (0.086) (0.111) (0.042) (0.051) 
Business environ.       
Bribe -1.613 0.767 0.345 -0.821 -0.638 -0.780** -2.200 -2.818* -1.463** -1.465 0.236 0.072 
 (2.235) (2.738) (0.923) (0.938) (0.443) (0.374) (2.173) (1.697) (0.744) (0.893) (0.395) (0.311) 
Obstacle_crime 0.303 0.002 -0.054 0.025 -0.134** -0.035 0.130 -0.179 -0.277*** -0.311*** -0.052 -0.133*** 
 (0.241) (0.509) (0.096) (0.091) (0.054) (0.066) (0.399) (0.341) (0.097) (0.093) (0.039) (0.051) 
Firing difficulty 0.622** 0.833** -0.054 -0.246** -0.004 0.016 0.713** 0.239 -0.269** -0.364*** -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.300) (0.392) (0.104) (0.110) (0.050) (0.058) (0.353) (0.365) (0.106) (0.120) (0.023) (0.037) 
Competition_ind -2.415*** -0.807 -0.441*** -0.263 0.078 -0.032 -2.299*** -1.026 -0.397** -0.204 0.084 0.179** 
 (0.548) (0.652) (0.144) (0.187) (0.119) (0.194) (0.566) (0.641) (0.184) (0.188) (0.073) (0.081) 
Tariff -0.209 0.380 0.206 0.296 0.046 0.119 3.046** 1.321 1.300*** 1.476*** -0.255 0.372 
 (0.449) (0.665) (0.193) (0.219) (0.146) (0.108) (1.438) (1.320) (0.320) (0.389) (0.263) (0.259) 
Foreign 0.247** 0.632*** 0.193*** 0.223*** 0.235*** 0.003 0.419*** 0.649*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.224*** 0.011 
         (0.104) (0.096) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.018) (0.145) (0.105) (0.048) (0.054) (0.051) (0.020) 
Country-ind avg of  -0.046 -0.683* -0.013 0.076 0.317*** -0.031 -0.266 -0.621* -0.013 0.068 0.069 -0.197*** 
      foreign (0.320) (0.382) (0.100) (0.102) (0.075) (0.063) (0.363) (0.366) (0.091) (0.093) (0.049) (0.051) 
Finance       
Bank 0.348* 0.519** 0.082 0.022 -0.037 -0.031 0.765** 0.398 0.116 0.117 -0.069 -0.008 
 (0.184) (0.248) (0.079) (0.085) (0.037) (0.052) (0.309) (0.275) (0.104) (0.113) (0.049) (0.043) 
Trade credit 0.175 0.593 0.192* 0.232** 0.204*** 0.076 0.579** 1.433*** 0.181** -0.007 0.155** 0.082 
 (0.302) (0.460) (0.108) (0.108) (0.070) (0.069) (0.279) (0.344) (0.078) (0.103) (0.070) (0.053) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,872 5,950 4,860 4,964 6,489 4,596 2,855 3,621 3,047 3,136 3,944 2,739 
r2_a 0.097 0.294 0.235 0.126 0.180 0.019 0.158 0.324 0.238 0.146 0.183 0.064 
Note.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.   Intercept not reported.  Standard errors are clustered at the country level.  Industry 
dummies also controlled for.
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                                 Table 10.  Using the sample with the same informality index as Africa  
 pooled similar informal index 
 tfp lnLPs LPgrow saleG exportSh inv_VA tfp lnLPs LPgrow saleG exportSh inv_VA 
Poor Africa 0.377** 0.762*** 0.122* 0.121* -0.019 0.015 0.180 0.830** 0.193** 0.247*** 0.011 0.047 
 (0.189) (0.279) (0.066) (0.069) (0.039) (0.040) (0.248) (0.345) (0.092) (0.092) (0.043) (0.038) 
Infrastructure       
  Telecom 0.485*** 0.777*** 0.131*** 0.117*** 0.034** 0.013 0.555*** 0.842*** 0.162*** 0.155*** 0.047*** 0.043** 
 (0.086) (0.105) (0.039) (0.041) (0.016) (0.018) (0.087) (0.122) (0.043) (0.045) (0.016) (0.018) 
Poli/inst. factors       
  Ln(party years) -0.148 -0.154 -0.090** -0.074* -0.005 0.002 -0.105 -0.288 -0.110** -0.106* -0.006 -0.016 
 (0.094) (0.138) (0.039) (0.042) (0.011) (0.012) (0.139) (0.202) (0.053) (0.054) (0.012) (0.010) 
  Ethnic frac. 0.350* 0.838*** 0.189** 0.155 -0.047 -0.041 0.734* 1.205** 0.174 0.049 -0.016 0.057 
 (0.204) (0.301) (0.085) (0.103) (0.039) (0.041) (0.421) (0.580) (0.140) (0.146) (0.052) (0.047) 
Busi. Environ.       
 Bribe -1.796 -1.445 -0.759 -1.233** -0.117 -0.091 -1.884 -1.531 -0.730 -0.876 -0.026 -0.266 
 (1.481) (1.879) (0.607) (0.624) (0.266) (0.305) (1.525) (1.900) (0.665) (0.721) (0.219) (0.286) 
  Firing diff. 0.814*** 0.877** -0.093 -0.269*** -0.014 -0.005 0.902** 1.082* -0.189 -0.427*** -0.019 0.039 
 (0.277) (0.389) (0.096) (0.103) (0.035) (0.042) (0.455) (0.594) (0.154) (0.153) (0.033) (0.030) 
   
Competition_ind -2.431*** -0.876** -0.255*** -0.106 0.036 0.159*** -2.481*** -0.921** -0.165 -0.028 0.035 0.117** 
 (0.371) (0.354) (0.090) (0.090) (0.044) (0.055) (0.468) (0.369) (0.114) (0.128) (0.038) (0.056) 
  Foreign 0.336*** 0.719*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.204*** -0.004 0.421*** 0.765*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.203*** -0.024** 
 (0.082) (0.074) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.104) (0.104) (0.033) (0.035) (0.042) (0.011) 
Finance       
  Bank 0.557*** 0.587*** 0.110 0.083 -0.072** -0.032 0.265 0.431 0.137 0.196** -0.031 -0.004 
 (0.173) (0.218) (0.070) (0.084) (0.032) (0.044) (0.232) (0.300) (0.085) (0.095) (0.030) (0.042) 
  Trade credit 0.158 0.898** 0.260*** 0.188* 0.163*** 0.076 0.062 0.876* 0.271** 0.158 0.140*** 0.032 
 (0.261) (0.390) (0.094) (0.102) (0.039) (0.048) (0.340) (0.512) (0.112) (0.114) (0.037) (0.047) 
Firm and other 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
others controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,770 12,764 10,482 10,729 13,818 10,002 5,784 7,846 6,390 6,552 8,584 5,854 
r2_a 0.127 0.338 0.243 0.135 0.162 0.024 0.135 0.367 0.258 0.158 0.201 0.025 
 
Notes:  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.   Intercept not reported. White standard errors are 
clustered at the country level.   Only countries within the same range of informality index as Africa are included in the regressions.   Industry 
dummies also controlled for.  Omitted firm controls include those for ln(firm age), state ownership, ownership largest, and lagged levels for the 
growth equations. Other controls include: ln(population), landlock, any conflicts in 10 years, obstacle_crime, tariff, country-industry average of 
foreign.  The coefficients for omitted other controls tend to have similar results with or without restricting the sample. 
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Table 11. Accounting for performance differences between the Poor African countries  
and the top half performers of the similar-income sample  
 
TFP 
 
Ln Labor 
Productivity 
 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Growth 
Sales Growth Export Growth 
 
Investment / 
Value Added 
 
       
Difference between Africa 
and the top half 
performers of the similar-
income sample 
 
-0.662 
 
 
-0.855 
 
 
-0.119 
 
 
-0.034 
 
 
-0.135 
 
 
-0.096 
 
 
Infrastructure 114.4% 141.9% 171.5% 535.2% 39.8% 
   Telecom  114.4 141.9 171.5 535.2 39.8 
Finance 10.9% 50.5% 59.2% 116.0% 26.2 
   Bank  10.9 8.9  -6.9 
   Trade credit 41.6 59.2 116.0 33.1 
Political and inst. factors 
Of which: 
-19.7% -36.6% -12.8% 134.3% 
  
   Ln(party years) 46.2 134.3 
   Any conflicts in 10 years  
   Ethnic Fractionalization -19.7 -36.6 -59.0 
Geography 
Of which   
 
 
-33.0% -8.0% 
   Ln(population)  -33.0 
   Landlock dummy  -8.0 
Business environment 
Of which: 
-12.4% 
 
-2.6% 55.2% -6.9% 10.8% 
   foreign -6.7 -22.2 -6.6 
   Country-ind average of 
foreign  -7.3 5.2 
   Firing difficulty  12.9 
   Bribe   64.5 
   Tariff   
   Competition_Ind -12.4 -7.2 5.6 
   Obstacle_crime   7.0 
Note. We do not report the effects for some variables (e.g., industry dummies, Africa, and firm characteristics).  When a cell is empty, it means 
that the coefficient is statistically insignificant from zero or the magnitude is too small (less than 4 percent). 
     The number of the first row is the absolute difference between the Africa sample (excluding the four richest countries) and the better 
comparison group sample.  The rest of the numbers represent the percentage of contribution that a specific variable or category contributes in 
explaining the African disadvantage.  
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Appendix.  The list of countries for each sample  
(The numbers in the table are GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars)   
 
Africa
Angola2006 767.4 Guinea2006 141.6 Niger2009 170.5 
Benin2009 353.8 GuineaBissau2006 396.5 Rwanda2006 250.2 
Burundi2006 109.2 Ivory Coast2009 530.1 Senegal2007 522.3 
Cameroon2009 692.0 Lesotho2009 501.5 Sierra Leone2009 254.1 
CapeVerde2009 1553.8 Liberia2009 144.4 Swaziland2006 1463.2 
Chad2009 285.2 Madagascar2009 260.2 Tanzania2006 316.3 
Congo2009 1156.4 Malawi2009 148.4 Togo2009 248.5 
DRC2006 85.8 Mauritania2006 429.5 Uganda 283.1 
Eritrea2009 151.0 Mozambique2007 307.8   
Gambia2006 332.7 Namibia2006 2460.2   
 
The average comparison group (i.e., with GDP per capita < 3000 USD) 
Albania2007 1541.0 Georgia2008 1079.9 Romania2009 2595.5 
Armenia2009 1425.2 Guatemala2006 1749.2 Russia2009 2866.3 
Azerbaijan2009 1945.6 Honduras2006 1244.9 Samoa2009 1800.0 
Belarus2008 2067.6 Kazakhstan2009 2332.2 Tajikistan2008 217.2 
Bolivia2006 1039.3 Kyrgyz Rep.2009 352.1 Timor Leste2009 299.7 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina200 
2041.4 LaoPDR2009 450.0 Tonga2009 1659.7 
Bulgaria2009 2412.6 Mongolia2009 683.1 Ukraine2008                    1037.3 
Colombia2006 2955.2 Nepal2009 245.1 Vanuatu2009 1288.0 
Ecuador2006 1515.7 Nicaragua2006 818.4 Vietnam2009 617.1 
ElSalvador2006 2359.4 Paraguay2006 1346.5 Yemen2010 561.3 
Fiji2009 2190.4 Peru2006 2228.3 Uzbekistan2008 725.4 
Fyr Macedonia2009 2075.8 Philippines2009 1201.7   
 
The better comparison group (i.e., with GDP per capita < 3000 USD, and top half in firm performance)
Albania2007 1541.0 Georgia2008 1079.9 Tajikistan2008 217.2 
Armenia2009 1425.2 Peru2006 2228.3 Ukraine2008 1037.3 
Bosnia & Herz.200 2041.4 Philippines2009 1201.7 Vietnam2009 617.1 
Bulgaria2009 2412.6 Romania2009 2595.5   
Fyr Macedonia2009 2075.8 Russia2009 2866.3   
 
Note. The “Africa” in the table excludes South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia.  We also excludes Ghana 
due to potential data errors (with extremely high labor productivity, due perhaps to wrong uses of currency units 
during a currency rebasing period). 
 
 
 
